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EXCHANGE RISK, POLITICAL RISK AND MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

Jonath an Eaton and Stephe n J. Turnov sky*
Septem ber 1981

Notes:

*_Aus tralian Nation al Unive rsity and Unive rsity of Illino is
Center Discus sion Papers are prelim inary mater ials circul ated
to stimu late discus sion and critic al comment. Refere nces in
public ations to Discus sion Papers should be cleare d with the
author to protec t the tentat ive charac ter of these papers .

I.

INTRODUCTION
With the advent of increased exchange rate flexibility, the role of

policy and the transmission of economic disturbances under flexible rates

have become topics of considerable interest.

Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963~

in their early analysis of the theory of policy in open economie~ emphasized
the importance of the degree of capital mobility.

Subsequently, a number

of authors have analyzed the implications of the degree of capital mobility
forexchange rate and income determination in open economies;

see for example

Kouri and Porter (1974), Branson (1975, 1979), Girton and Henderson (1976), and
Turnovsky (1976).

The polar case of perfect capital mobility has received

most attention.
Capital is perfectly mobile when investors consider domestic bonds,
denominated in domestic currency, and foreign bonds, denominated in foreign
currency, to be perfect substitutes.
substitutability to break down.

Two factors may cause perfect

One is exahange r>isk:

the values of the

two bonds are defined in terms of different currencies and the exchange
rate at the date of maturation is uncertain.

The second is default r>isk:

investors may perceive that foreign bonds are more subject to the risk
of default than are domestic bonds.

For one thing, in the event of default

the investor must pursue his claim through a foreign legal system, which
is likely to be costly.

Aliber (1973) terms differences in default risk

arising from the "foreignness" of assets as "political risk".
Where domestic and foreign securities are assumed to be only imperfect
substitutes, it is important to distinguish the degree of imperfect mobility
due to these two sources of risk.

While this distinction has been noted in

optimal portfolio models developed by authors such as Kouri (1976) and
Adler and Dumas (1977), it has not been brought out in the current macro
literature.

The objective of the present paper is to investigate the

macroeconomic consequences of this distinction and to show how it may be
crucial in assessing the effects of various macroeconomic disturbances under
varying degrees of capital mobility.

We- find that well-known results about

i.

the effects of increased capital mobility en the efficacy of monetary
policy are correct when the increased mobility is due to a reduction in
exchange risk, but not necessarily so when it is due to a reduction in
· default risk.
To carry out this analysis we derive the tmderlying behavioral
relationships from an optimizing model of portfolio allocation and speculation
in a stochastic. context in which both types of risk are present.

~f ~-h a

model is first developed for a single risk averse investor in Section 2.
A number of authors have developed financial ··models of currency speculation

and foreign investment; see e.g. Solnik (1973), Grauer., Litzenberger and
Stehle (1976), Kouri (1976), Adler and Dumas (1977), Roll and Solnik (1977),
Frankel (1979), Fama and Farber (1979), Dornbusch (1980), Stein (1980).
We find it useful to provide our own derivation, since other models either
consider only exchange risk or make very restrictive assumptions about
the interaction of exchange rates and prices.
Section 3 uses these relationships, under the assumption that
investors are i-0entical in each cotmtry, to formulate a general equilibrium
macroeconomic model.

We assume that the economy we consider is small, so

that it treats certain characteristics of the foreign economy as parametric.
Section 4 carries out certain comparative static exercises with this model.
Specifically, it considers some important relationships between the available
policy instruments and endogenous variables, and shows how these are
affected by the degree of capital mobility in the two senses in which this
term is defined.

In particular, we show that, as long as there is a

possibility of default, there exists an independent role for forward market
intervention.

In the limiting case of no default risk, when domestic and

foreign bonds are perfect substitutes on a covered basis, this independent
role ceases and forward market intervention becomes equivalent to bond
market intervention.

Secondly, the comparative statics of changes in the

degree of capital mobility are discussed.

Apart from the results on the

3.

effectiveness of monetary policy noted above, we also consider how varying
degrees of capital mobility affect the response of the domestic economy
to foreign shocks.
2.

OPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR

Consider an open economy in which individuals plan over a two
period horizon, one period of which is devoted to working, the other to
retirement. 1 During period t members of the working generation earn labor
income which they allocate between current cox1s_umption and savings, where
savings can take the form of additions to holdings of domestic bonds, foreign
bonds, and domestic money. 2 Assuming, for simplicity and without loss of
generality, an initial wealth of zero, the budget constraint during this
period may be expressed as
(2 .1)

where
(2. 2)

and

wt
yt

= real
= real

wealth at time t,
income at time t,

ct = real consumption at time t,
Mt
Bd
t

= holdings

of domestic money at time t,

= holdings

of domestic bonds, denominated in domestic currency,

at time t,
Bf
t

= holdings

of foreign bonds, denominated in foreign currency,

at time t,
Es
t

= spot

price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency,

at time t,
p

t

= domestic

price level at time t.

In period t a working individual may also take a position in the fon,·ard
market, but since this does not involve financial commitments during that
period, this does not appear in the constraint (2.1).

4.

Domestic bonds pay a nominal interest rate 1t,while foreign bonds
pay it.

The nominal yield on domestic money is zero.

We also assume that

foreign bonds are subject to default with probability~.

This risk, which

we take to be exogenous, may be assumed to reflect "political" factors
abroad, and applies symmetrically between the domestic and foreign economies. 3
Forward contracts, like domestic bond holdings, are not subject to default
risk.
Under these assumptions, real resources available for consumption
.,. : •··.

during period t+l, the retirement period, are given by
(l+~)B: + ~+l (l+ipE:+lB: + Mt + (E~+l

(2. 3)

where E! is the one-period forward price of ~orei8J1 currency, St is the
forward purchase of foreign currency at the end of period

t.

The variable

· ~+l is a dummy variable, taking on the value 1 if default on foreign bonds

j
lI

does not occur, and O otherwise.

According to (2.3), real wealth available

at the end of period t+l consists of:

domestic bonds, including the interest

i

i

earned on them;

the stock of foreign bonds valued at the end of period

exchange rate, provided that there is no default, or zero otherwise;
the stock of money;
market;

and the gains made through speculation in the forward

all four of these quantities deflated at the end of period price

For convenience, we shall define the share of wealth allocated to the
three assets by
(2 .4a)

AM - (Mt/Pt)/Wt

(2.4b)

AF

-

s f
(EtB/Pt)/Wt

(2 .4c)

AD

-

(B:/Pt)/l\ = 1

AM - AF

while analogously the real purchases of forward currency, as a ratio of
wealth, can be defined by
(2.4d)

5.
We shall assume that the individual's objective can be expressed
in terms of the following two period utility fllllction
(2 .5)

That is, individuals are assumed to derive utility from consumption in
period t and also from the consumption of their wealth in period t+l.
In addition, following Fama and Farber (.1979), for example, we assume that
holdings of real money balances facilitate current consumption, and hence

. ·-

yield direct utility.

While the procedure of introducing money into a

utility function is a much argued one, because in our subsequent analysis
we take domestic bonds to be riskless, it is necessary in order·to derive
a well defined demand fllllction for money,

Finally, note that, for simplicity,

the utility function is assumed to be additively separable over time.
The individual's problem is to choose Ct,
M
F
we require Ct, A,
A,
1 - AM - AF

= AD >

M

F

S

A, A, and A where

0 to maximize the expected value

of (2.5) subject- to the budget constraints (2.1), (2.3).

We shall assume

.

s

that at the time these variables are chosen, Qt+l' Pt+l and Et+l are random
variables.
Individuals anticipate that ~+l will equal one with probability
and zero with probability (1 - n).

The domestic price level and the exchange

rate are assumed to be generated by the stochastic processes
Pt+l =p t +upt+l

(2 .6)
(2. 7)

where pt= ln Pt,

e; = ln

e:,

TI

and the random variables ui+l' u:+l are

assumed to be normally distributed
p
N(
a 2)
ut+ 1 "" P' p
s
N(
o2)
ut+l ""
£,
s

6.

and osp denotes the correlation between ui+l and u:+l·

In general, these

random variables are· functions of random variables of both domestic and
foreign origin impinging on the economy.

If, for example, exact purchasing

,power parity (PPP) obtains, and the foreign price level is rising nonstochastically at rate p*, then

~

= p

E

p*

and o 2

s

that Qt+l is independent of both ui+l and u~+l;

= ap2 = asp

We assume

default risk on foreign

bonds is independent of exchange risk and stochastic price movements.
In order to derive explicit expressions-·fo r the optimal holdings of
assetswe approximate the expectation of the objective function (2.5).
To do this it is convenient to expand (2.5} in a second order Taylor
series around Wt and take conditional expectations at time t to yield
(2 .8)

l

l
Next, substituting the relationships (2.4)

(2.7) into the expression for

wealth in retirement years, (2.3), we obtain
(2 .9)

Under the above specifications of the stochastic processes generating
Pt and E~, we may obtain approximations for the rates of return on money,
domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and speculation, from which the corresponding
means and variances can be calculated.
below.

These are presented in Table 1
These approximations assume that i, i*, p, E, o 2 , o2 , 1-n and
p
s
are sufficiently small to allow us to treat the product

of any two of them as approximately zero.
s

f

f

We define the real rate of

return on speculation as (Et+l - Et)/Et](Pt/Pt+ l).

Table 1
Real Rates of Return on Assets and Speculation

-p

Money
,

Variance

Expected Return

Real Rate of Return

Asset

a

Domestic Bonds

2

p

,r (i *+e-p )-(1-n)
t

Speculation

(1

2
s

Substituting the expressions for the real rates of return into
(2.9) we obtain the approximaUon
(2.9')

l\+l -

l\ ~ {it(l->.M-,.F)

+ [~+l(i; + u!+l) - (1 - ~+l)]/

+ {u~+l - ft)As -· [l - AF(l - ~+l)]ui+1}wt
Taking conditional expectations at time t yields
(2 .10)

Et(Wt+l - Wt)~ {it(l->.M-,.F) + [n(i* + e) - (1 - ,r)]>.F
+

Ce - ft)"s -

P}wt

Next, squaring (2.9') and taking conditional expectations we derive
+

(2 .11)

cr

2
p

where all second or higher order terms are ignored as being negligible.
Maximizing (2.8) subject to (2.1), incorporating (2.10) and (2.11),
leads to the following first order optimality conditions 4
(2.12a)

(2.12b)

u2'.lt = 0

u;1
>.F

(llrt /R) +

=

2+

nos

'11'0

2 S

sp

(1-,r)

- 1rcr A

s

8.
).S =

(2 .12c)

(6et/R) + a

2
a

SE

-

2 F

11'0 ).

s

s

(2.12d)

U' +
C

where

6r

E{u2'
: 11'(i*
t

t

dl\+l}
= 0
dCt
+ E) -

(1 - 11') -

i

t

measures the difference between the expected nominal interest rates
on foreign and domestic bonds;

is the expected excess of the spot rate in period t+l over the forward
rate,where throughout the paper we shall use the notation xt +1,
. t to
denote the expectation

of x formed at time t for time t+i;
R =
-

and

-U2"Wt /U 2'

is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

The optimality conditions

with respect to money and consumption, (2.12a) and (2.12b), are straight.
forward and need not be discussed further.
Of particular interest is the optimality condition for speculation,
(2.12c).

The three terms in the numerator of this expression correspond

to three motives for taking a position in the forward market. 5 The
first of these derives from currency speculation.

The term 6et represents

the expected gain from buying one unit of foreign currency in terms of
domestic currency. If R = 0 (investors are risk neutral) or if o 2 = 0
s

(there is no exchange risk), a non-infinite speculative demand for forward
exchange requires that the forward rate in period t represent an unbiased
prediction of the spot rate in period t+l.

If Rt O and o

2 = 0, a bias

s

may emerge.
The second motive is to hedge against inflation risk.

In the

particular case in which exact PPP obtains and only the domestic price
level is uncertain, then

02

s =

0

2
sp

In ~his case, the second term of (2.12c)

9.

divided by the denominator equals unity.
his

The individual sells

entire wealth forward to hedge against inflation risk.
The third motive derives from fon.,Jard cover.

In this case the

individual sells a fraction of the total value of his foreign bonds forward
equal to the probability of no default on these bonds.

In the case in

which there is no default risk, he covers the entire holdings of these
bonds by a position in the forward market.
Solving equations (2.12b) and (2.12c) ,s~ultaneously , one can
obtain the following expression for the demand for foreign bond holdings
in terms of the covered interest differential:

(2.13)
where
Act= n(i; + ft) - (1-n) - it
denotes the expected covered interest differential.

In deriving (2.13) from

(2.12b) and (2.12c) all terms of second order of sm~llness are ignored.
When

n = 1, (2.13) reduces to Act/0;

in the absence of default

risk the covered interest differential must be zero in order for the
demand for foreign bonds to remain finite.

The condition Act= 0 then

reduces to the familiar covered interest parity (CIP) condition
it= i*t + f t
In this case >.Sand/ cannot be determined independently from (2.12b)
and (2.12c).

Rather, these two equations determine the net open position

in foreign bonds
>.

(2.14)

F

+

>.

S

(Aet/R) + asp
= ------,,,----....
2
a
s

In this case it follows from CIP and the underlying stochastic process
determining the exchange rate· that Aet = es
t+l,t - est+ it* - it' so that
the relevant interest rate determining the demand for foreign bonds is the
uncove1 ed interest differential. 6
1

10.
In the presence of default risk, however, the expected covered
interest differential may deviate from zero since domestic and covered
foreign bonds no longer represent perfect substitutes.

In this case,to

the first order of approximation,th e demand for foreign bonds depends on
the aovered interest differential, the probability of default and the
degree of relative risk aversion.

We have repressed second order te---ms

which include, among other things,- the variance of the exchange rate.
This term enters because, in the presence of-default risk, forward cover
cannot eliminate exchange risk entirely.
More specifically, the demand for foreign bonds will be affected
negatively by the variance of the exchange rate.

From (2.12c) the

investor obtains forward cover on a fraction n of his total foreign bond
holdings.

If default risk does not occur he is subject to exchange risk

on the remaining 1-n.

i

If it does occur he must nevertheless honor a

forward sale of foreign currency in amount of nAFWt.

Uncertainty in the

real value of these magnitudes rises with the variance of the exchange
rate.

However, this relationship is of second order of magnitude so does

not appear in (2 .13).
A set of equations analogous to (2.12) may be derived for a

representative investor in the foreign country.

In particular, if we

denote the corresponding magnitudes with an asterisk, we obtain parallel
1
to (2.12c), (2.13~ respectively,
2 F*
-6et/R* - o
no A
AS* = _____2,,,__._._
sp* _ _
_
s_

(2.12c')

a

s

F*
{ 6c*/R*
}
A = max
t
, O

(2.13')

(1-n)

where
Here we define

F*

A

6c*t = n(i t - f ) - (1
t
S*

A

- n) - it*

as foreign purchases of domestic currency forward and

as foreign purchases of domestic bonds, each as shares of foreign

real wealth.

But for simplicity we assume that foreigners perceive

the default risk on domestic bonds to be w.
3.

FOJU.n.JLATIQN. OF A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MACRO MODEL

So far we have derived the optimal bond and forward position of
a single optimizing individual who takes prices, interest rates and
exchange rates as given.

We now assume that this individual is representative

of all portfolio maximizers in his own economy to characterize conditions
for equilibrium in the money markets, forward market, and bond markets .
., .- : ...
~

Finally, we introduce assumptions about behavior in the commodity market that
yield conditions for equilibrium in that market as well.

Together,

equilibrium conditions in these four markets constitute a general equilibrium
macroeconomic system.

To simplify the analysis we make the assumption that

the domestic economy is small relative to the rest of the world so that
it views the foreign price level and interest rate as parametric.
3.1

Money Market Equilibrium
Money market equilibrium in each ·cotmtry requires that

(3.1)

>.?\rt= Mt/Pt

(3.2)
where Wt now denotes domestic real national financial wealth and?-\· the
domestic money supply.

An asteri~k denotes parallel quantities abroad.

Consider the domestic money market.
defined implicitly by equation (2.12a).

The demand for money is

This equation may be combined

with (2.1) and (3.1) to describe domestic money market equilibrium by
(3. 3)

It is interesting to note that given C, the demand for money depends only
upon the domestic interest rate i and domestic output Y.
} . h 1n
. fl uence
w11c.

Any other factors

·
. 11ty
. t h e opt1ro
. fl uence on C, via
. 1n
'M(.) do sot h rough t h e1r

h

condition (2.12d).

Since our analysis does not purport to contribute

anything new to the demand for money, we-shall simply assume that (3.3)
can be adequately approximated by the log-linear relationship

(3.4)
where mt - tm Mt'

pt= tn Pt, yt = 1n Yt··

In writing (3.4) we are in

effect asswning that the critical elements influenci ng Care Y and i. 7
3.2

Bond Market Equilibriu m
Equilibriu m in the markets for domestic and foreign bonds requires

that
.< -

(3.5)
(3.6)

B*/P*
t t

where Bt and

a; denote the

supplies of domestic and foreign bonds

respectiv ely.
Expressin g the expected covered interest rate different ial as
t:,,c

t

=

the real domestic demand for foreign

bonds,

obtained by combining (2.13) with (2.1), is given by
'FW

(3. 7)

A

t = A\ F (1· t* + ef
t - ets -- 1. t' 1• t ) (Y t - Ct)

which we approxima te by the log-linea r relations hip·

(3.7')
The tenn w , capturing the substitut ion effects between covered foreign
1
and domestic bonds, is positive, and as default risk tends to zero, w ➔
1
The sign of w~ is ambiguous, since it incorpora tes interest rate effects
on savings and hence on

l\.

implies that

We therefore assume that w F < 0. Thirdly,
2
< 1, the income effect is positive, so that

assuming that

~.

If savings is interest inelastic , then (2 .13)

F
w > 0.
3

Finally, we should note that, as expressio n (2.13) indicates , foreign
bond demand depends upon

,r

magnitude re-mains constant,

as well.
it

By assuming that this

may be suppresse d from the functions .

The real domestic demand for domestic bonds, (1 - / 1 - :/)\\'
obtained residuall y from equations (2 .1), (3-. 3) and (3. 7).

t

is

Analogou sly,
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the following log-linear approximation is adopted
(3. 8)

We have assumed alread~ that w > 0. Unless act/oit is highly positive,
1
it seems reasonable to assume that the demand for domestic bonds varies
positively with the domestic interest rate so that wD
2

and

>

0.

Since

are assumed to be positive functioDS

of yt, the coefficient w~ is indeterminate a~d _so no sign restriction is
imposed. 8
The real supply of domestic bonds is given by Bt/Pt.
bt

=1n

Letting

Bt, and recalling the definition of pt, we adopt the linear

approximation 9

(3.9)
where w ~ (Bt/Pt), the average stock of domestic bonds divided by
4
'\,

the average price level, and. w = w [1_- 1n w ]. We shall normalize units
4
4
5
so that 1n w = 1 and w = 0.
4
5
To simplify the analysis we shall restrict ourselves to the case·
in ~hich AF> 0 while

AF*= O.

From (2.13) and (2.12') observe that this

case is more likely to arise when, among other things, the domestic price
level is more highly correlated with the exchange rate than is the foreign
price level.

Combining (3.8) and (3.9), then, we obtain as a condition for

equilibrium in the domestic bond market
(3.10)

(3.11)

s
➔
covered interest parity, it= i~ + etf - et,
1
Otherwise, an increase in the covered foreign interest rate has

In the limiting case in which-w
obtains.

00 ,

a less than proportional effect on the domestic interest rate, while the

14.
the domestic interest rate responds positively to changes in the real
bond supply and ambiguously to changes in income.

3.3

Forward Market Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the forward exchange market is described by

(3.12)

where Gt denotes the net government purchases of foreign currency in the
· forward market translated to domestic currency uni ts at the foruazid exchange
rate.

Substituting the expressions for). S and). S* from (2.l2c) and (2.12c')

into (3.12) we obtain
l1et

(3 .13)

2

as

[wt +
R

F
/\t~
R*

where

.

I

that is, the nominal value of foreign wealth translated to domestic currency
units at the foPward rate and deflated by the domestic price level.
The first term of (3.13) corresponds to the net spec:u.Zative demand
for foreign currency forward.

Its sign is given by 6et and its absolute

magnitude depends negatively on the variance of the exchange rate and on
the domestic and foreign coefficients of risk aversion.

The second term

denotes the net demand for foreign currency for arbitrage.

The sign of

this term depends on whether the domestic economy is a net importer or
exporter of bonds.

The third term of (3.13) is the net demand for foreign

currency forward as an inflation hedge.

Its sign depends upon the relative

magnitudes of the correlation between the spot exchange rate and the price
levels in each country.

The fourth term is simply the government position

in the market.
The eauilibrium condit.ion (3_ 13) enahlec: 11c: .tn. dP.terrninP thP

1S.

relationship between the forward rate and the expected future spot rate.
Specifically it can be seen that the forward rate is more likely to
overpredict the expected future spot rate (6(\< 0) if:

(1) the domestic

price level is more correlated with the exchange rate than is the foreign price
level, i. e ~ asp > -a sp *, when
· the countries are of equal size in terms of weal th;
(2) the domestic cotmtry is larger in terms of weal th, while price

variability is the same;

(3)

assets denominated in domestic currency

exceed national wealth.10 Given these factors,· ·the degree of overprediction
will be greater, the greater the degree of exchange rate variability

a;

and the degrees of relative risk aversion in each country.
2

Since we treat os, asp' Rand R* as constants and assume that
~

F* = 0, we may represent the condition for forward market equilibrium,

incorporating (3.7) and the definition of 6et, as
(3.14)

where

gt= tn Gt and~= Gt/Pt.

Here we have used.a log-linear approximation

to Gt/Pt similar to the one applied to Bt/Pt above.
3.4

Commodity Market Equilibrium
We assume that the prices of some tradable commodities are established

in auction markets while the prices of other tradable and nontradable
commodities are established by contract in the previous period.

The prices

of the first type of commodities are hence flexible within the period, while
the prices of the latter group are fixed.

The prices that are flexible

are determined by the international law of one price.

Thus

PA = p* + ets
t
t

(3.15)
A

where pt denotes the logarithm of the price index of the flexibly-priced
commodities.

Prices that are established by contract, we assume, are

set at the price level expected to obtain in the relevant period, as of

16.
the previous period.

Our assumption here parallels the contract theory

of wage determination of Gray (1976), Fischer (1977) and Phelps and
Taylor (1977).

Thus, we have

(3.16)
where the superscript C denotes the contract-priced goods.

The overall

price index is therefore
(3.17)
where 6 is the share of the flexibly-priced coJ1D11odities.

Pi and

As long as

e: are imperfectly correlated, an increase in 6 raises the correlation

between the domestic price level and the exchange rate, asp·
Finally, we assume that the deviation of output from its natural
level
level.

y is

determined by the unanticipated component of the domestic price

That is,

e => o

(3.18)
where we normalize units by setting

y=

0.

Such a specification fol lows

from the contract theory of wage determination referred to above. 11
Together, the conditions for money market equilibrium, (3.4),
bond market equilibrium, (3.10), ·forward market equilibrium, (3 .14), and
the price and output equations, (3.17) and (3.18)1 constitute a complete
macroeconomic model of a small open economy.

The

system of equations

determines equilibrium_va lues of the five endogenous variables Pt, it,
s
f
s
et, et and yt in terms of the expectations et+l,t'
Pt,t-l and the exogenous
variables, mt, bt, gt, i; and p;, as well as the structural parameters
of the system.
rationally;

To close the model we assume that expectations are formed

i.e.,that price and exchange rate expectations are formed

on the basis of the model itself and all available information.
We now use the model to contrast the effects of two different ~•ays
in which capital can become more mobile.

On

the one hand, exchange risk

17.

or aversion to exchange risk may fall.
increase in the parameter y.

This will be reflected by an

As a consequence, the forward rate will

become more closely tied to the expectation of the future spot rate.
On

the other hand, default risk or aversion to default risk may fall,

raising the parameter w . As a consequence, the domestic interest rate
1
will be determined more closely by .the covePed interest parity condition.
We show that the way in which capital mobility is increased has important
implications for the response of the economy ··1:·o .._a monetary disturbance.
4.

COMPARATIVE STATICS

· In the model contained in equations (3,4), (3.10), (3.14), (3.17)
and (3.18), individuals' expectations about the future influence their
current behavior.

As is well known (c.f. Taylor (1977)), when expectations

are formed rationally, such models have non-unique solutions.

There is

only one solution to this model, however, for which the exchange rate and
the price level remain botmded into the-infinite future.

We focus on this

solution to the model.
Our purpose in solving the model is to analyze the response of the
economy to changes in the policy variables mt, bt and gt and also to changes
in the foreign variables ii and Pi·

Disturbances in the exogenous variables

may be distinguished by a number of characteristics:

(a) their expected

permanence or transcience, (b) the extent to which they are anticipated
or unanticipated, (c) whether they occur immediately or are announced in
advance.

In principle, we could analyze the effects of many specific

types of disturbances,

We shall limit ourselves, however, to two types.

First, we will consider the effect on impact of disturbances that are
(a) unannounced, (b) unanticipated, and (c) expected to last only one
period;

second, we will consider the effects in steady state of changes in

the exogenous variables that are perceived as permanent.
To analyze the effect of a temporary, unanticipated disturbance
in period t we may assume, without loss of generality, that
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mt,t

= bT,t

while mt,t = bt,t = gt,t
Pt,t-l

z

O.

= i;,t

- gt,t - P;,t
z

= 0, t

>

= O,

t implying that e:+l,t

P;,t = i~,t = 0,

t

<

t which implies that

The reduced form expressions for the endogenous variables

are easily obtained by· solving the five equations of the system with
these assumptions.

However, the expressions are messy and we do not

report them explicitly.
To analyze the steady-state effects of permanent changes in the
..
. s
s
-s
exogenous variables we set Pt,t-l =pt= p and et+l,t =et= e, where
•.•

-

x denotes the steady state value of x.

Again the expressions are tedious

and are not reported.
4.1

Money Market, Bond Market and Forward Market Intervention
The government can affect the domestic economy by changing the supply

of money, the stock of domestic bonds, and its forward market position.
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Manipulation of each instrument impinges initially on different markets
and has differential effects on domestic income, the price level, and the
interest rate.

The three policy instruments are linearly

in some special cases.

independent except

We summarize the most important relationships between

policy instruments and endogenous variables:
1.

The effect, on impact, of an unantioipated, transitory increase in

mt, bt or gt is expansionary.

As is well known, increasing mt or bt

raises nominal wealth above its desired level at initial commodity prices.
Prices that are flexible rise, inducing an expansion in income.
in gt' government holdings of foreign exchange forward, raises
the rate of return on oovered foreign bonds.

An

e:

increase

and hence

Individuals' demand for

money and domestic bonds falls so that a higher price level is required to
_ equate demand to the existing nominal stocks.

steady state effect of

For similar reasons, the

permanent increases in mt, bt and gt is to raise

yt remains fixed at its long-rWl natural level.
2.

A permanent increase in mt lowers the domestic and covered foreign

interest rates, while a pennanent increase in bt or gt does the opposite;

bt has relativel y more impact on the domestic rate while gt has relativ~l y
greater influence on the covered foreign rate.
3.

In the limit as the probabili ty of default goes to zero,

.and covered interest parity obtains.

In this case bt and gt

w + m,
1
affect all

domestic variables in the same linear proportio ns,

w bt + Agt. In other
4
words, bond market and forward market intervent ion become equivalen t in

their effects on all endogenous variables ;
4.

either one is therefore redundant .

In the limit as either the degree of risk aversion or exchange risk

goes to zero, y

+

m

and forward market intervent ion ceases to have an effect

on any endogenous variable.

Any forward market intervent ion by the

monetary authority is exactly offset by the actions of speculato rs.
5.

In the limit as both exchange risk and default risk go to zero, (or

else risk aversion goes to zero) both y +•and w + m and neither bond
1
market nor forward market intervent ion can have any effect. The familiar

propositi on that fiscal policy (i.e. a change in the government deficit
unaccompanied by changes in the money supply) is ineffecti ve under flexible
rates and perfect capital mobility (see Mundell (1963)) is true only if
perfect capital mobility is interpret ed to mean. an abs~nce of default risk
and exchange risk.

4.2

Otherwise , fiscal policy is still effective .

Capital Mobility, the Internati onal Transmiss ion of Disturban ces
and the Role of Policy
In terms of our model, an increase in capital mobility can be

interpret ed to mean either (1) a diminutio n

of default risk or aversion

to default risk (an increase in w ) or (2) a diminutio n in exchange risk
1
or aversion to exchange risk (an increase in y). While a number of studies
have emphasized the importance of the degree of capital mobility for both

the efficacy of policy and the internati onal transmiss ion of disturban ces,
no distincti on has been made in this literature , to our knowledge, hetween
the two wars in which it can ·occur.
In fact, an increase in capital m~bility in either sense tends to
increase. the sensitivi ty of the domestic economy to foreign disturban ces.
I
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The response vf the domestic interest rate[at:]a change in the foreign
interest rate, whether it is transitory

aii

or permanent

ai)
ll*

(

increases with an increase in either w
or y. Likewise, the
1
response of the domestic Jrice level to a transitory increase in the
foreign price level

[::~

~ncreases with both ~ and y, while the
1
an
.
steady-state response
-=- 1s always zero.
ap*
Increased capital mobility in.its two different forms, however, can

have very different implications for the effec~~ of domestic policies.

For

example, a reduction in exahange Pisk or aversion to exchange risk always
increases the steady-state responses of the exchange rate and price level
to permanent changes in the domestic money supply.

This is because as y

increases, the steady ·state forward and spot rates move closer together,
and the covered foreign exchange rate becomes less flexible, as does the
domestic interest rate.

As a result, more of the change in the money

supply must be reflected in a higher price level and exchange rate and less
in a lower interest rate.
By contrast, a reduction in aversion to default risk has an ambiguous
effect on the steady-state relationship between the money supply and price
level.

An

increase in w raises or lowers the term
1

ap/am

as

(4 .1)

The reason for the ambiguity is as follows.

increase in w always ties
1
the domestic interest rate more closely to the covered foreign interest rate.
An

When y is large the covered and 1.mcovered foreign rates are close, so that
a reduction in default risk ties the domestic interest rate more closely
to the uncovered foreign rate as well, so that it is less flexible.

As

with a reduction in exchange risk, then, more of a change in money supply

must be absorbed by the price level rather than by the interest rate.
When y is small, however, the covered and uncovered for.dgn rates can diverge,
and the increase in m can be accompanied by a fall in} and
F

w2

ef - e

5

•

lf

is large then the fall in i raises the demand for cc:'e!'ed foreign bonds.
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The consequent increase in the sale of foreign exchange forward from
arbitrage requires, for forward market equilibrium, offsetting
speculation; e-s - e-f must consequently rise to elicit thi~ speculation.

i* + ef -

The interest rate on covered foreign bonds,

es, therefore falls,

-

inducing a further fall in the domestic interest rate i.

Increased capital

mobility in this sense can therefore make the domestic interest rat~.nvre
(

flexible.

.·

In other words, an increase in the degree of capital mobility,

in the sense of domestic and covered foreign'·bonds becoming closer
substitutes, can reduce the rise in the price level and increase the change
in the interest rate resulting from a monetary expansion.
S.

CONCLUSION

Exchange risk and political risk both diminish the mobility of
capital.

Macroeconomic analyses of open economies have emphasized the

importance of the degree of capital mobility but have not, typically,
distinguished between. these two impedim~nts of mobility.
impinge on the economy in different ways.

On

In fact, they

the OJ)e hand, exchange

risk creates a divergence between the forward exchange rate and the spot
rate expected to prevail when the forward contract matures, in turn
creating a divergence between the expected rates of return on covered and
uncovered foreign bonds.

Exchange risk does not, however, affect the

relationship between the covered foreign interest rate and the domestic
interest rate.

Political risk, on the other hand, weakens this second

relationship, but does not affect the first.
In the absence of both exchange risk and political risk, i.e. if
capital is perfectly mobile, changes in the supply of domestic bonds or
_ i~ the government's forward position have no effect on the domestic economy.
Only changes in the money supply have an impact.

Introducing exchange

risk alone makes bond market and forward market intervention effective,
although their effects are not linearly independent.

They are essentially
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equivalent and one or the other is redundant.

Alternatively, introducing

default risk alone gives efficacy to bond market intervention, but not
to forward market intervent~on.

Finally, if both exchange and default

risk are present, then·forward market, bond market, and money market
intervention all have independent effects on the economy.

An increase in capital mobility due to the diminution of the 'ffects
of either type of risk increases the sensitivity of the domestic interest
rate to the foreign interest rate and the s~nsltivity of the domestic
price level to the foreign price level.

An increase in capital mobility

in the form of an increase in the elasticity of speculation increases the
steady state effect of a change in the money supply on the domestic price
level.

However, an increase in capital mobility that takes the form of

decreasing the divergence between the domestic and foreign covered interest
rates has an ambiguous effect on the relationship between money and the
price level.

FOOTNOTES
1.

The "life cycle" context is convenient in that it allows us to ignore
the correlation betwe·en earned income in the second period and the
rates of return on assets. Introducing nonwealth income in the second
period poses no conceptual problems, but clutters the analysis. See
Frankel (1979) for a model which does introduce other sources of income
and discusses their consequences.

2.

We assume that domestic bonds and money are outside assets; i.e. , they
constitute net wealth. Frankel (1979) has shown that if no nominally
denominated assets are net wealth, the forward rate equals the expectation
of the future spot rate. Even if bonds do not constitute net wealth,
however, a bias emerges as long as money is.. considered to be part of
weal th.
··· : · ·,.

3.

See Kenen (1965) for an early analysis of the forward market incorporating
potential default. Political risk may derive from the threat of exchange
controls as well as from the threat of outright debt repudiation. In either
case the risk may not be the loss of the total net worth of the investment.
When the threat derives from exchange controls, the expected value of net
worth may even be preserved, but if payment is delayed, forward cover
obtained for the investment will no longer be appropriate. For our purposes
it is the risk that repayment not occur on the date for which the forward
cover is arranged, thereby exposing the investor to exchange risk, that
is relevant. Our analysis could easily be modified to incorporate a
preservation of some or all net worth in the event of default. See Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) for a model in which the probability of default is
endogenous.

4.

We shall let primes denote derivatives and shall denote partial derivatives
by corresponding lower case subscripts.

5.

The first and third motives are equivalent to what Kenen (1965) terms
the demand for forward cover by speculators and arbitrageurs. Kenen
also identifies a third source as demand by traders, which does not
seem to be the exact equivalent to our demand as an inflation hedge.

6.

A common specification of imperfect capital mobility in the macro literature
is to specify the demand for bonds as being proportional to the unaovered
interest differential. It is evident from our analysis that procedure is
consistent with portfolio maximization only in the absence of default risk.

7.

For the case in which the utility function is logarithmic, C will depend
only upon Y.

8.

Expressions (3.3), (3.7) and (3.8) implicitly define a savings function,
which will be highly nonlinear in form. Lucas (1975) follows a similar
procedure of defining all assets demand flDlctions explicitly in log-linear
form, with a savings function being defined residually.

9.

The approximation in (3.9) is obtained as follows
Bt "' B
-= pt
p
Now

Bt - B ~

B

+

-B
p

[\- fi] -

tn[ 1

+

8t -

a

BJ

:[\-

p]

=

w

4

(1

+

= tn Bt/8 = bt - R.n

Bt - B
B

s.

p

t

-

p

p

l

p

Similarly

10.

t

p '\,

-

=

p

pt - 1n P so that

Adding the domestic money market equilibrium condition (3.1) to the domestic
bond market equilibrium condition (3.5) yields:
AF*EsP*W*/P

t t t

t

AFW

t

= (Mt + Bt)/Pt - wt .,. :_--..

Thus

Foreigners1 holdings of domestic bonds must be adjusted by the forward
premium in calculating the real level of assets denominated in domestic
currency.
11.

Equation (3.18) may be obtained in the following way: Assume that all
wages are determined by one-period ahead contracts so that we may set
wt= pt t-l' where wt is the logarithm of the wage in period t. In the
contract-price sector the wage divided by the output price is constant
as are output and employment. Thus we may set Yt = 0, where y~ is the
logarithm of the output of the contract-price sector. In the flexible
price sector the wage divided by the output price is inversely proportional
to the price level. Thus output and employment expand when prices are
high and conversely. Defining ~ as the output of the flexible-price
sector, we have
8' > 0

or, substituting (3.15) and (3.17),

where
12.

e

=

8'/6.

Elsewhere (Eaton and Turnovsky (1980)) we discuss how these three forms
of intervention are related by the balance-sheet constraint of the
combined monetary-fisca l authority.
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